Concepts / Anonymity networks

Anonymity networks

Traffic correlation

Also called end-to-end correlation, timing attack, traffic confirmation

Linking a Tor user to a destination by matching the timing and volume of traffic seen at both ends of the circuit.

The same bursts at both ends
The same bursts at both ends

Encryption hides the content, not when and how much data moves. A watcher who sees both ends of the circuit matches the bursts without decrypting anything.

Traffic correlation links a Tor user to a destination by matching the timing and volume of traffic at both ends of the circuit. [[onion-routing|Onion routing]] hides who talks to whom, but not when or how much data moves. A watcher who sees traffic enter Tor and leave the exit lines up the bursts, breaking no encryption. Tor's design does not protect against a watcher of both ends.

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