The idea
Stage 3's session on the inventory database named the prize: a backup machine at 10.0.2.40, a nightly copy of
the crown-jewel store. The lesson of this last stage is where you go for it. The crown jewels exist in more than one
place, and the copy is the soft one: the backup is guarded as plumbing, not as the data it holds — here it hands out
the whole copy over an ordinary web request, no login, reachable through the same relay. You take the crown jewels
from the copy nobody watched.
Steps
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Follow the pointer to the backup
Stage 3's database session named the prize: the backup machine
tdw-core-bakat10.0.2.40, a nightly copy of the crown-jewel store. The lab has the relay from stage 2 open again for you. Confirm the backup answers through it: it is on the same core network, in reach of the same web server you own.You are aiming at the copy, not the hardened original — because a copy of the most sensitive data is usually the softer way to the same thing.
kali:~# proxychains curl -s http://10.0.2.40/
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The copy nobody guarded
Ask the backup what it serves. It lists a dump folder — the whole copy, handed out over an ordinary web request with no login. The original store would make you sign in; its backup, treated as plumbing, does not.
That gap is the whole opening of this stage: reaching the copy and reading it have become the same thing.
kali:~# proxychains curl -s http://10.0.2.40/dumps/
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Take the crown jewels
Pull the dump through the relay. It is the crown-jewel copy: the customer billing tokens and the crown-jewel marker the whole engagement was for. Reached from a machine that never had a path here, through one trusted web server, off the copy nobody watched.
kali:~# proxychains curl -s http://10.0.2.40/dumps/crown-jewels.csv
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Save it off
Reading the data is not the same as having it: save it back to your own machine. Write the dump to Kali and record its size and a hash — the evidence a report hands the client, and, for a real attacker, the copy that leaves the network. The relay that carried you in carries the data out.
kali:~# proxychains curl -s http://10.0.2.40/dumps/crown-jewels.csv -o /tmp/loot.csv; echo "staged $(wc -c < /tmp/loot.csv) bytes to /tmp/loot.csv"; sha256sum /tmp/loot.csv
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Guard every copy — the defender's answer
The whole chain ends here because a copy of the crown jewels was guarded as plumbing. The defender's answer is to treat every copy as the crown jewels:
- Guard backups like the original. The copy gets the same firewalling, the same login, and the same access rules as the original store. Reaching it must not mean reading it.
- Encrypt it, and keep the key elsewhere. The backup is encrypted with a key the backup machine does not itself hold, so a stolen dump is unreadable.
- Watch reads of the copy. A large or unusual read of a backup should raise the alarm exactly as it would on the original; backups are where this is most often missing.
- And close the first thread. None of this stage happens if the firewall never trusted the web server inward. Layer the defences: the firewall split from stage 1, the per-machine logins from stage 3, and a guarded backup.
Running this against a network whose owner has not authorised you in writing is a crime under laws like the UK Computer Misuse Act and the United States' CFAA — the signed engagement is what makes it a test and not an offence.
Run these steps on real machines