Labs / Web Attacks / The web app's attack surface

Lab 4 of 5 · The web app's attack surface

CSRF: forging a transfer from a logged-in browser

An online bank authorises transfers by session cookie alone, a GET with no token. A page navigating a signed-in customer wires their money to you.

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The idea

Osei has an authorised engagement against Dunmore Savings, a small online bank. He cannot read another customer's balance and he has no one's password. But the bank has a habit worth testing: it decides a money transfer is genuine the moment the request arrives carrying a valid session cookie — nothing more.

A browser attaches a site's cookies to every request to that site, even one set off by a different site's page. So if Osei can get a logged-in customer's browser to send a transfer request, the bank will honour it as the customer's own — Osei never sees the cookie, he only causes the action. That is cross-site request forgery. On this LAN a customer's browser (the holder bot) keeps opening a page Osei controls, already signed in to the bank. Osei's job: make that page move the customer's money to his account.

The browser attaches the cookie, not the attacker
The browser attaches the cookie, not the attacker

Steps

  1. The bank trusts the cookie

    You are on Osei's box, kali. Osei has his own Dunmore account (m.osei) — opened to receive the payment and read the result. Sign in to it and read the account, keeping the session in a cookie jar so the next request reuses it. Open the bank in the Viewer too, to see what a customer sees.

    The point of this step is small but decisive: the bank identifies you by the sid cookie alone. Nothing else proves who you are.

    kali:~# curl -s -c /tmp/osei.jar -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"username":"m.osei","password":"osei-lab-account-pw"}' http://10.0.1.20/api/login
    kali:~# curl -s -b /tmp/osei.jar http://10.0.1.20/api/account
  2. A transfer is a GET with no token

    Look at how a transfer is made. Move £1 from Osei's account to the holder's, the ordinary way the bank's own page does it, and watch the shape of the request: it is a plain GET with the details in the URL, authorised by the cookie, with no anti-CSRF token anywhere. Anyone — or any page — that can make this request with the cookie attached can move money.

    kali:~# curl -s -b /tmp/osei.jar -G --data-urlencode "to=d.whitlock" --data-urlencode "amount=1" --data-urlencode "memo=probe" http://10.0.1.20/api/transfer
  3. Forge it from a page the victim opens

    Now the forgery. Write a web page whose script navigates the viewer's browser straight to the bank's transfer URL — to=m.osei — and serve it from your box. The holder's browser, already signed in to the bank, keeps opening this page. When it does, the script runs, the browser makes a top-level GET navigation to the bank, and — because the bank set no SameSite and the browser's Lax default still sends cookies on a top-level navigation — the holder's sid rides along. The bank sees the holder's session and pays Osei.

    Serve the page, then watch Osei's own statement: the forced credit from d.whitlock will appear, carrying the holder's wire reference.

    kali:~# python3 -m http.server 8000 --directory /tmp
    kali:~# curl -s -b /tmp/osei.jar http://10.0.1.20/api/account
  4. Swap seats: the token fix

    Now you run Dunmore. The fix is not to check the Referer (spoofable, and privacy tools strip it) but to demand a secret the forging page cannot get: a per-session anti-CSRF token the bank issues to its own pages and checks on every state change. The bank's correct transfer endpoint, POST /api/transfers, does exactly that. Send Osei's forgery to it — the same cookie, but no token — and watch it refused.

    kali:~# curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" -b /tmp/osei.jar -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"to":"m.osei","amount":740}' http://10.0.1.20/api/transfers

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